This study investigates the impact of short-term precautionary selection and insurance on household decisions with respect to their participation in different saving
Introduction
The decision to save either by hoarding cash or placing deposits into financial intermediaries (financial institutions) is an important one, especially in developing economies where households typically save cash at home (Stix 2012) . This trend in savings can lead to adverse impacts on economic development (Levine and Zervos 1998) . Despite this observation, the existing literature has paid little attention to the issue of selecting between hoarding cash or saving in financial intermediaries. Consequently, this study seeks to understand whether shortterm precautionary motives of households affect their participation in and contribution to saving intermediaries.
In developing economies, the ability to access a formal financial system is not equal among citizens. In rural areas especially, individuals are at a disadvantage due to differences in: education; geographical distance; and formal institutional networks. Filling the gap between the demand and supply of funds in a formal financial system, the informal financial mechanism is now recognized as an important channel to accumulate savings for investment. Such local capital mobilization helps improve the welfare of all participants as well as fulfil personal needs and hedge against possible future risks to households through savings (Kimuyu 1999; Gugerty 2007; Kedir and Ibrahim 2011; Pellegrina 2011) .
The appeal of informal institutions such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) or private moneylenders is greater in developing economies, especially in rural areas, where the formal financial system is still weak and full insurance coverage is not offered. Additionally, the informal financial system does not require much initial capital or sophisticated operation, such as offices, labourers, computers, and an accounting computer system. Another advantage of the informal system is in the aspect of information dissemination, which may lead to lower transactions costs and less time-consuming processes. People who engage with a specific informal saving institution often come from the same community with the same information available to them. Therefore, participants can reduce the risk of information asymmetry as well as easily manoeuvre around issues such as adverse selection, moral hazards, misevaluations, high monitoring costs, high controlling costs, and repayment insecurities, and, at the same time, increase both trust and valuable social capital (Carpenter and Jensen 2002; Etang, Fielding and Knowles 2011; Kedir and Ibrahim 2011) .
However, an informal financial mechanism cannot completely substitute a formal one because of its intrinsic nature of catering to small and distinct geographic areas. It cannot exploit the potential advantages of economies of scale. Moreover, the informal mechanism is prone to a negative domino effect if one representative goes bankrupt.
As depositors' trust forms the bedrock of informal institutions, any negative event will have a more severe impact on depositors as compared to the impact experienced by depositors in formal institutions. However, regardless of its benefits and disadvantages, the informal financial mechanism will continue to exist as a complementary channel to formal systems and play an important role in the process of development. Each household's choice in savings mechanism -formal intermediaries, informal intermediaries, or cash hoarding -is determined by the liquidity each mechanism offers. For example, long-term motives like setting up a business or a motive to bequest something do not require liquid savings, as the probability of a sudden need for this money is rather small. The precautionary motive requires highly liquid savings in developing economies, where insurance for precautionary purposes seems to be less developed (Carrin 2002) .
As one of the world's fastest growing economies over the last three decades, Vietnam presents an interesting case. The demand for capital in the country has increased alongside growth, resulting in the financial system taking a more active role. The financial system has undergone vast changes in its functions and in its quality, especially in rural areas. During 2007 and 2008, Vietnam had high interest rates, reflecting a high demand for liquidity. At its peak in mid-2008, the nominal interest rate in some financial institutions reached 19 per cent (SBV 2008) , indicating a shortfall of liquidity in the economy. However, the main objective was to control inflation during this period; inflation had reached 22.1 per cent that year (World Bank 2013) . In accordance with current fiscal policy, the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) applied a contractionary policy, and the SBV supply of liquidity was reduced by increasing the prime lending rate from 6.5 per cent in January of 2008 to 15 per cent in June that year. Additionally, commercial banks' and other financial institutions' access to credit from the SBV was restricted because most of these entities could not provide sufficient collateral (SBV 2011) .
As these financial service providers did not have access to the tertiary market (SBV 2011), they were left with only two options to access cash to counterbalance the scarcity in liquidity: (i) the primary market (individuals and organizations); and (ii) the secondary market (other commercial banks and financial institutions). Access to the secondary (inter-bank) market soon became difficult when the overnight interest rate reached 25-27 per cent that year, a rate much higher than those found in the primary market (SBV 2011). Some financial institutions also required collateral for their lending. Because many financial institutions faced multiple obstacles when accessing the secondary market, they returned to the primary market to access cash.
Despite financial institutions having a high demand for deposits, cash hoarding became extremely dominant in Vietnamese households (Newman, Tarp and Broeck 2012) . Therefore, the question of how to motivate households to place their savings in formal financial institutions, so that their money can circulate in the economy instead of remaining underneath pillows, became an important consideration for policymakers. Motivated by the current strain on the financial market, this study investigates whether households' short-term precautionary motive in rural Vietnam affects their decision to place their monetary savings in formal and/or informal saving intermediaries, instead of placing cash at home.
Compared to previous studies, this study goes further in terms of its sample selection and its methodology. To avoid a sample selection biasthis may arise because households included in the sample have no savings and were, therefore, unable to engage any savings mechanisms -this study only includes savers. In terms of methodology, this study considers both participation probability and household contributions to saving intermediaries.
It also takes into account the issue of endogeneity for the relevant explanatory variables in order to provide consistent results.
The remainder of this discussion proceeds as follows: Section 2 is a literature review and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 examines the results, and Section 5 offers conclusions and the policy implications of the research.
Literature Review and the Research Hypotheses
Until now, the literature has largely neglected households' selection of cash hoarding versus making deposits into saving intermediaries. In rare cases, as in the studies of Carpenter and Jensen (2002) , and Newman, Tarp and Broeck (2012) , authors have directly investigated the participation of households in formal and informal saving intermediaries.
Carpenter and Jensen (2002) investigate factors that affect household decisions in using formal versus informal saving instruments in Pakistan. The saving mechanisms considered were banks, representing a formal savings instrument, and bisi, representing an informal mechanism similar to a ROSCA. To identify the determinants of household participation in different saving mechanisms, the authors use bivariate probit estimations for both banks and bisi in urban and rural areas. The study found that there was a higher probability that higher income households saved in banks rather than in bisis. Numeracy and literacy are important factors that increase the possibility of households' savings in a bank while literacy has a minimal effect on bisi participation. The level of education influences households' use of a bank. However, it does not influence the participation in a bisi. Other variables that affect household decisions include the number of female adults in a household, the occupation of the head of household, and the location of the household (urban or rural).
Similar to the work of Carpenter and Jensen (2002), Newman, Tarp and Broeck (2012) employ a panel data of household surveys from year 2006, 2008 and 2010 to investigate the role social networks play in determining the level of household savings in rural Vietnam. Based on the study by Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998) , they create a model in which information (represented by membership in a social network) plays an important role in determining the level of household deposit savings. Social networks were divided into two sub-categories -high-and lowquality network. The results reveal that generally, membership in a high quality network is positively and significantly connected to the overall savings level of households.
When overall savings level is disaggregated to different types of savings, it became clear that membership in a high-quality network will promote savings in both formal mechanisms and cash savings at home. However, a high-quality network membership has a negative marginal effect on participation in informal savings mechanisms. The interaction variable between group density and network were robust only at the overall savings level and at the more fragmented "home savings" (i.e. cash savings at home) level. Results were not robust for participation in formal and informal savings mechanisms. The study also found that membership in a low-quality group had no effect on household savings level. This empirical analysis seems to support the theory mentioned in Section 1, as the authors found that targeting information through a network increased the level of formal savings.
In order to contribute to the limited literature on savings in developing economies, this paper investigates the impact of the precautionary motive for short-term cash management on households' decision to join a saving intermediary in rural Vietnam. The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Households that are driven by precautionary motives to save their money in the short term have a higher probability of hoarding cash and a lower probability of saving through saving intermediaries.
Households that tend to be more vulnerable to risks and uncertainty are motivated by a precautionary motive. These households are more likely to hoard cash at home, as they require high liquidity in the event of an emergency. Saving intermediaries typically do not offer high liquidity. For households in remote areas, this line of argument is exceptionally common and reasonable, as financial transaction costs are higher than the costs of hoarding cash at home.
The vulnerability of households to risks and uncertainty can be reduced through the enforcement of insurance, which should theoretically and empirically reduce the level of precautionary savings (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1994a; 1994b; 1995; Kotlikoff 1979; Chou, Liu and Hammitt 2003; Chou, Liu and Huang 2004) . Therefore, a second hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2: An insurance system can substitute the role of households' short-term precautionary motive and affect the decision to join (or not join) saving intermediaries.
The argument follows that if short-term precautionary motives reduce the probability of households to participate in saving intermediaries, then the development of an enforced insurance system can inverse this relationship. The number of insurance contracts that a household signs and holds can be used as a proxy for an insurance system. It is expected that a higher number of insurance contract will be positively related to the probability of a household to participate in a saving intermediary. Households that participate in various types of insurance schemes are less vulnerable to risks as the risk of losing their savings are covered. Thus, the demand for liquid savings decreases and households will participate in saving intermediaries rather than hoard cash.
This research not only examines the relationship between insurance and the probability of households' participation in saving intermediaries, but also the relationship between insurance and households' contribution to saving intermediaries. This is mentioned in the third and fourth hypotheses below.
Hypothesis 3: The short-term precautionary motive is negatively related to participants' contribution to saving intermediaries.
Hypothesis 3 implies that participants driven by precautionary motives will have lower balances in saving intermediaries compared to households driven by long-term motives to save money.
Hypothesis 4: The number of insurance contracts that participants sign and hold is positively related to their contributions to saving intermediaries.
Hypothesis 4 implies that insurance participation will increase household deposits into formal and informal saving intermediaries. The more types of insurance households participate in, the more their deposits in saving intermediaries will increase.
In accordance with the two types of saving mechanisms investigated here, households are divided into two different groups: a) participants, including both formal and informal participants, and b) non-participants. Formal participants and informal participants represent households that have deposits in formal saving intermediaries and households with deposits in informal saving intermediaries, respectively. Non-participants are those who hoard their cash at home.
Empirical Analysis
The study investigates the impact of short-term precautionary motives in managing cash flow and the number of insurance contracts on households' decision in the selection of saving mechanisms in rural Vietnam. D i measures two items: the propensity of household i to participate in savings, and households' contribution to savings intermediaries. It is modelled as:
where X j is a vector of three (j = 3) control variables: short-term precautionary motives, the number of insurance contract and the interaction term of the two variables, W ki is a vector of exogenous variables, which include characteristics of household head and of household, k represents the number of exogenous regressors and u i is the error term. The three control variables are considered separately from other independent variables as they have direct implications for the results of this study. Head of household characteristics include gender, education, employer, and age. The education of the head of household variable has three different values: (1) tertiary and above, (2) professional high school, vocational training or other diplomas, and (3) below primary school level (i.e. has not finished elementary education or has had no formal education). The employer of heads of household are classified into the government sector, firms and enterprises, and private employers (small business owners or other households). The base category for this variable is self-employment. Household characteristics include household wealth, the total number of household members, dependency rate, ethnicity, location of residence and the number of insurance contracts that households have signed and still hold on to.
Because the dependent variable contains censored values (left-censored zero), the Tobit model is used to conduct estimations (Cameron and Trivedi 2010) . However, the Tobit model often faces weaknesses during the diagnostic analysis, which includes the violation of the normality assumption and heteroscedasticity.
1 Therefore, the model is separated into two parts: a binary outcome model and a linear model. The probit model is employed in the first part to estimate the probability of households' participation in formal and informal saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The dependent variable (D i ) in equation (1) is a dummy variable, it receives 1 if household i has deposits in either formal or informal saving intermediaries and D i receives 0 if household i hoards cash.
The linear model in the second part estimates household contributions to formal or informal saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The dependent variable (D i ) in equation (1) is the natural logarithm of household deposits in saving intermediaries. If the error term in the model is related to the regressor, then the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators will be inconsistent and cannot yield a causal interpretation. Three main variables, precautionary motive for short-term cash management, the number of insurance contracts, and their interaction, in this case study are considered to be endogenously determined. The instrumental-variables (IV) method is employed to eliminate endogeneity.
The set of instrumental-variables comprises four exogenous variables: ethnicity; gender of the head of household; the interaction term between ethnicity and gender of head of household; and the distance between the households' residence to the centre of the town. Some intuitive explanations are used to prove the possible impact of these instruments on the motive for precautionary savings and insurance. First, those belonging to the Kinh ethnicity may have easier access to organisations, as this group constituted 85.7 per cent of the total population in Vietnam in 2009. The second largest ethnicity -the Tay group -accounted for only 1.89 per cent of the population (UNFPA 2011). The ethnicity of households, however, is still relatively important in Vietnam, as people belonging to the larger Kinh group might have better connections and stronger networks to rely on, which may reduce households' precautionary motive for short-term cash management, but instead have motives to invest or buy high-value durable goods.
The gender of the head of household may also affect saving motives, especially in developing economies. As shown in Table 2 , 82 per cent of households have males as the head of household. In Asian countries, women often play the role of taking care of the household, such as helping children with homework, while men are responsible for work outside of home and thus earn income for the household. Besides, males are normally the decision-maker in the household and provide connections to people outside the family. The female head of household may concentrate more on the availability of cash in the short term, while a male head of household may focus more on long-term investments to generate additional income. The number of insurance contracts held per household was also found to be influenced by the gender of the head of household.
Gender differences were found to have significant impact on insurance in many studies (Rand and Tarp 2011; Dong et al. 2003; Buor 2004; Thoursie 2007) . Female claimants receive lower payments from insurance than men, holding other factors constant (Doerspinghaus, Schmit and Yeh 2008) . Additionally, insurance held is affected by distance of households to financial institutions, which is considered as a proxy for transaction costs. Distance is seen as an important factor that impedes the insurance sector in developing economies. Buor (2004) demonstrates that the distance to health facilities has a high impact on female insurance utilization. In another study, Dong et al. (2003) find that the distance to health facilities had a negative influence on the willingness to pay for community-based health insurance in Burkina Faso.
The data used for this study come from a household survey of rural areas in A total of 3,269 households participated in this survey. The survey questionnaires comprised a wide range of variables related to households and characteristics of household members, including household demographics, land use, agricultural production, household assets, occupation and income, training, savings, credits, negative shocks and social networks. The households surveyed were geographically spread between the north and south of Vietnam and were classified into four regions: Northern Midlands -mountain; North Central; Central Highlands; and Mekong River Delta. Households that both hoard cash and deposit into financial institutions are excluded from the sample. The results would be biased if these households were included, and the study would not clearly identify factors that influence households to hoard cash or to save in financial intermediaries. Therefore, the scope comprises households that only hoard cash (including gold, and jewellery) and those that only deposit in financial intermediaries (formal or informal). This reduces the sample to 1,342 households. The table also provides insight as to why households save. These motives were separated into two categories: short and long term. Shortterm precautionary motives is defined as savings that can be used for short-term, regular, and/or unforeseen circumstances. Savings for agricultural inputs is considered as a precautionary motive. Since most households in rural Vietnam engage in agricultural production, they set aside money for inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, or labour. Farmers often face problems with inputs including the low quality of seeds and fertilizers, rising salaries of seasonal labours and extra expenses for water and electricity. Households' long-term savings is defined as savings that are not used for regular, immediate or sudden needs. In the full sample, more households saved for the long term (55.74 per cent) rather than for the short term (44.26 per cent). However, both participants and non-participants behaved differently. The rates of non-participants with short-term precautionary and long-term motives did not differ largely from one another; most participants (72.83 per cent) saved for the long term. Under motives to save for the short term, healthcare expenses was the issue of utmost concern, while accumulating money for large expenditures was the most important issue under motives to save for the long term. This finding is in line with Besley and Levenson (1993) and Kedir and Ibrahim (2011) . When households' motives to make profit from investments were compared, more participants record it as a motive as compared to non-participants. For non-participants, the investment motive accounted for only 1 per cent while other groups of participants had a higher share at 8.15 per cent, 6.1 per cent, and 9.43 per cent for all participants, formal participants, and informal participants, respectively. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of other variables used in this study. The data show that most heads of household were male (82 per cent). Seventy per cent of heads of household were self-employed whereas the remaining 30 per cent were employed by individuals (20 per cent), by the public or government sector (6.2 per cent) or by firms or enterprises (2.5 per cent). There was no significant difference between non-participants and participants in the detailed comparison. The educational indicator separated education of heads of household into three levels. Ninety per cent of heads of household belonged to the Primary category; 8.1 per cent of heads of household belonged to the Vocational category while 2.2 per cent of heads of household were in the Tertiary category. The mean difference for Vocational was statistically significant when participants and nonparticipants and when non-participants and formal participants were compared.
The geographical distribution of households were as such: 38.3 per cent were located in the North; 28.2 per cent were located in the Central Highlands; 22.7 per cent were located in Central Vietnam; and 10.8 per cent were located at the Mekong River Delta. The ethnicity of the heads of household differed between non-participants and participants. The Kinh group -the largest ethnic group in Vietnam -constituted 70.7 per cent of total observations. Other ethnicities made up the rest at 29.3 per cent. The dependency rate (the proportion of people under-sixteen and oversixty years old) for the non-participant group was relatively higher than that of the participant group.
One option in substituting precautionary motives, namely insurance, was adopted by most Note: Numbers are means of variables; standard deviation is in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively (significance level of mean differences when compared to non-participants). Source: VARHS08.
households in the sample. The data show that 84 per cent of households hold at least one insurance contract among household members. On average, each household has 1.33 insurance schemes. There was also a mean difference when the number of insurance contracts between formal participants and non-participants and between informal participants and non-participants were compared. The average number of insurance contracts that participants signed and held was statistically higher than the number than that of non-participants at the 5 per cent significance level.
Study Results

Household Participation in Saving Intermediaries
In the binary model, the impact of short-term precautionary motive and the insurance variable on three different groups of households were considered. The first group -termed the total group, includes all households (non-participants and participants). The second group -the formal group -includes non-participants and formal participants. The third group, namely, the informal group, includes both non-participants and informal participants, and the probability of participation between two parties within each group is compared. For robustness, three estimations were run for each household group. The first estimation includes two variables (short-term precautionary motive and the number of insurance contracts). For the second estimation, head of household characteristics were added as control variables, and the third estimation employs both the head of household and household characteristics, as control variables. Table 3 presents the estimation results on the probability of household participation in formal and informal saving intermediaries. The influence of the short-term precautionary variable and the insurance variable is robust across the estimations for both formal and informal participants.
These results confirm Hypothesis 1. They indicate that the short-term precautionary motive may lead to a decreasing probability of households making deposits in saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. This result means that households driven mainly by precautionary motives either have a lower tendency to deposit their monetary savings with intermediaries or they choose to hoard cash for precautionary reasons. Informal participants seem to play a dominant role in determining the sign and significance level of the Precautionary Motive variable in the Total group. Within the formal group, the Precautionary Motive variable was not statistically significant. Precautionary motives played a larger role within the informal group, as reflected by a larger coefficient. This means that households driven by precautionary motives to save in the short term have a higher probability of depositing into informal saving intermediaries than depositing money in formal saving institutions.
The negative sign of the short-term precautionary motive variable indicates that the cost of hoarding cash is greater than its benefits. These costs include opportunity costs such as having no interests paid, the risk of theft and the destruction of money (e.g. by fire). These situations can be avoided if households deposit their money in saving intermediaries. A short cost-benefit analysis may lead households to keep their monetary savings at home instead of depositing their savings in formal or informal saving intermediaries.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported empirically, as the insurance system is found to be a supplement for short-term precautionary savings. In the estimation, the number of insurance contracts was statistically significant and positively related to household participation. The more varied in insurance types held by a household, the higher the probability of participation in saving intermediaries. These results confirm the view that households that pay insurance premiums are less inclined to hoard cash. Thus, the insurance system can encourage households to save in financial institutions.
The interaction term is only significant for households that engage with informal intermediaries. It has a weak positive relationship with the probability of household participation. The positive relationship implies that there is a higher probability that households with 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. Source: Authors' estimation.
precautionary motives and own insurance will save in informal saving intermediaries. This indicates that insurance contracts can not only substitute for short-term precautionary reasons but also reduce the negative impacts of the precautionary motive.
In models that included education as a control variable, it shows that education has no effect on households' decision to either place their savings in formal or informal saving intermediaries. Similar to Kedir and Ibrahim (2011) , whose results show that there is no evidence of the impact of heads of household that work in the public sector on the decision to participate in ROSCAs, the choice of employers of heads of household was not significant and does not affect households' likelihood of participation in saving intermediaries. In all models, the dependency rate seems to decrease a household's motivation to join saving intermediaries. A higher dependency rate may be associated with a higher need for precautionary savings or a higher liquidity in savings. For example, households with more young individuals have larger monthly expenditures on items like health, education, and others. However, this variable is statistically insignificant for formal participants, and similar to the informal group, has a negative sign. The informal group played a dominant role in the significance level and signs of coefficient in the total group.
The empirical results in this section confirm our first and second hypothesis. Households with precautionary motives to save for the short-term have a lower probability of engaging in saving intermediaries. Households that own insurance were more likely to participate in savings intermediaries, which mean that insurance can substitute savings that are motivated by short-term precautionary motives.
Participant Contribution to Saving Intermediaries
This subsection presents participants' contribution to formal or informal saving intermediaries. In this estimation, non-participants were excluded from the sample. For participants and informal participants (except for the first estimation), the Hausman test indicates that the endogeneity issue persists. To eliminate the problem of weak instruments, the IV LIML model is used. The exogenous hypothesis test was conducted for formal participants and the test could not be rejected. Therefore, robust OLS estimation controlling for heteroscedasticity was used to yield consistent results.
The results in Table 4 show the determinants for the participant's contribution to saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam. The first three models include all participants. The next three models only include formal participants, and the last three are for informal participants. Most variables showed lower levels of significance compared to those in the probit estimations. This may be due to the smaller sample sizes for the formal participant group and the informal participant group at 82 and 106 observations, respectively.
Hypothesis 3 was empirically confirmed for formal participants. The short-term precautionary motive has a negative relationship on the participant's contribution to formal saving intermediaries. However, the relationship is weaker and has a lower significance level as compared to the estimations in the probit model. The magnitude of the coefficient was again larger for informal participants, which may indicate that the informal group plays a dominant role in the participation and contribution in saving intermediaries. With an underdeveloped insurance system, precautionary reasons to save played a large role in determining households' saving mechanism. When households are concerned with saving for precautionary motives, they will deposit less in saving intermediaries, especially in formal saving intermediaries, as it may generate higher transaction costs and has less liquidity compared to hoarding cash.
Hypothesis 4 is rejected, as the Insurance variable is not significant at the 10 per cent level. This result implies that regardless of the number of insurances that households hold, formal and informal participants will deposit indifferently into saving intermediaries. These participants may have other resources, which can insure households against risks and uncertainty, such as support from relatives and friends. Therefore they are confident in paying for all expenses in cases where they have to and do not rely only on insurance.
The interaction term between precautionary motive for short-term cash management and insurance is statistically insignificant, which means that it does not influence household contribution to financial saving intermediaries.
In summary, participants' contributions to saving intermediaries differed between formal participants who have precautionary motives to save for the short term and those who save for the long term. However, the role of insurance was not significant in determining the level of the participants' contributions to saving intermediaries.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Conclusions
This paper presents empirical evidence for the role short-term precautionary motive and insurance play with regards to household participation and contribution to saving institutions in rural Vietnam. Using a two-part model, the relationship short-term precautionary motive and the number of insurance contracts have with both household participation and participants' contribution have been identified separately. The probit model was used to test the first and second hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that households that regard the precautionary motive as the primary reason for their savings have a higher probability of hoarding cash or a lesser probability of joining any saving intermediaries, compared to households that have long-term motives. Hypothesis 2 states that insurance can be regarded as a substitute for the short-term precautionary motive. The linear model was used to address Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, which addressed the role short-term precautionary savings motive and the number of insurance contracts had in participants' contribution to saving intermediaries.
This study found that the first two hypotheses were empirically supported, while the third hypothesis was only partially proven. These results lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 4. First, the household selection between the short-term precautionary saving motive and the long-term motive statistically differs in engagement with saving intermediaries. If the primary motive of households is for the short term, then households tend to hoard cash rather than deposit their savings in saving intermediaries. Second, one possibility of substituting for short-term precautionary savings is through owning insurance, as the number of insurance contracts was found to be positively related to the probability of participation. Insurance can replace the role of short-term precautionary motives and the effect of the interaction term confirms this. Third, in terms of participants' contributions, which measures household deposits in saving intermediaries, the short-term precautionary variable had a significant impact on household deposits to formal saving intermediaries. Differences in motives -either for the short term or the long term -will lead to differences in formal participants' contributions. Lastly, the study found no significant evidence of the influence of insurance on participants' contributions to saving intermediaries in rural Vietnam.
Policy Implications
The results of this study have key implications for policymakers.
In a cash-based economy and an underdeveloped financial system, transaction costs are important in determining households' decision on the type of saving intermediaries. The importance of nationwide policies that aim at reducing transaction costs and the costs of saving in intermediaries should therefore be emphasized. One solution would be to form a small savings scheme on a national level. This scheme has been relatively successful in India, and is considered a channel for common people not only to contribute to the development of India, 2 but also to increase their living standard (Kasilingam and Jayabal 2009) . Since its implementation in 1991-92 to 2007, the gross collection of savings through this scheme has doubled in its net target (Collection Mobilisation, n.d.) .
Vietnam can utilize its dense post office network to introduce this savings scheme. In most communities, including those in rural areas, post offices are present. This can facilitate the mobilization of a household savings plan even in the most remote of areas. In addition, social networks should be considered as a secondary channel to mobilize small saving schemes. This scheme will exclude the majority of rural residents if it only targets people with a regular monthly salary, as the income of rural residents is derived mainly from agricultural production. Heads of community groups such as those in the Farmers' Union, the Women's Union, the Youth Union, or the Veterans' Union can be employed as part-time savings collectors for this scheme. People should be encouraged to register to make a monthly contribution in varying amounts; their savings can be collected at their homes by these agents. After the savers have submitted their contributions, they can verify their deposits through phones or Internet banking.
Opening local branches in rural areas and a physical presence of financial representatives or agents can reduce transaction costs for savers and thus increase participation of rural households in saving intermediaries. The experience of subSaharan African countries has shown that opening local bank branches in rural areas help improve the saving performance in these economies (Ikhide 1996) . This example should be a useful case study for the State Bank of Vietnam as it can consider reducing regulations and giving out more licences to open new financial intermediaries. The current regulations impede the expansion of financial institutions, as it takes time and increases costs to obtain licences to open new branches. Moreover, these financial institutions cannot effectively pursue their business plans as they are uncertain whether their licences will be approved.
For formal financial institutions, a combination of policies can attract more savings in rural areas. First, the formation of new branches should be considered, as mentioned above. Second, they should upgrade the technology used for their systems to meet the increasing requirements of customers. The installation of new ATMs in rural areas could be one solution. However, two main obstacles remain: (1) only a portion of banks have modernized their ATM systems to allow savers to conduct direct deposits; and (2) cross-bank deposits cannot be done. Third, financial institutions should combine their deposit incentives, such as the different types of deposit and the flexibility in time to deposit and interest rates to attract more savings. Another way to reduce the transaction cost is to extend the working hours of financial intermediaries during weekdays and the weekends. This change will give more choices to savers who work on weekdays and only have time on weekends.
In Kenya, a local mobile service, M-Pesa, introduced an application, which "allows users to deposit money on their telephone handsets, transfer e-money to another user with a simple text message, and withdraw cash at one of thousands of outlets" (Mbiti and Weil 2013, p. 369) , Vietnam can consider introducing this in the market. The cost of installation may be high, but like Kenya, which is also a developing country, the benefits far outweigh the costs. The system will not only give users a faster, safer, cheaper, and more convenient transfer method, but will also provide them with another effective channel to deposit savings. From the point of view of saving intermediaries, this system could be an effective way to increase money circulation in the financial system.
Further, policymakers can encourage households to deposit into saving intermediaries by increasing the credibility of informal financial institutions. Private money lenders and ROSCAs should be monitored by local authorities using a registration procedure that ensures informal financial activities are properly performed. Once these intermediaries are recognized by law, they will attract more participants. Currently, these intermediaries are not registered and operate privately, and are not subjected to control, observation, or audits from governmental offices. This issue may be the main reason for the recent bankruptcies of many informal intermediaries, which reduces their credibility in general. This leads to a decrease in household participation and contributions to this kind of financial mechanism.
Promoting households' participation in insurance can further increase their savings in financial intermediaries. Rural households can use insurance schemes as a channel to insure against risks rather than simply hoarding cash. Once insured, households move from saving for the short-term to long-term motivations, which leads households to use more services of financial intermediaries. However, the participation rate of Vietnamese households in insurance schemes is still small. At the end of 2013, voluntary social insurance, for example, attracted only 173,000 participants or only 0.5 per cent of total eligible labourers (Thanh Thủy 2014) . Policies aimed at encouraging households to participate in the insurance system must focus on two main issues.
The first is on insurance premiums, which is still relatively high compared to the income of households in rural areas. To cover this charge, poor households need financial assistance from the government via regulations, i.e. modifying the minimum income level a participant needs to earn before paying the full insurance premium. Individuals whose income is below the minimum level can pay 50 per cent in the first year, and then pay 5 per cent each year afterwards. The full insurance premium will come to effect only from the eleventh year onwards or whenever income exceeds the minimum income level.
The second issue is the unpopularity of insurance and a lack of understanding of the importance of insurance among the general population. The government needs to strategize a long-term effective plan to increase the awareness of insurance. Social networks, such as the Farmers' Union, the Women's Union, or cooperatives should be leveraged to channel information to households, motivating them to participate in the insurance system. This is especially in rural areas, where private insurance systems are rarely found or do not exist.
This paper is part of a burgeoning literature, in which precautionary motives to manage cash in the short term and insurance may drive savings. However, this is an area that is sorely underresearched. Using data from rural Vietnam, this paper finds that precautionary motives to manage cash in the short term decrease the probability of households to engage in formal and informal saving intermediaries, and that insurance can be a substitute for short-term precautionary savings. Short-term precautionary motives are also found to reduce the participants' deposits in formal saving intermediaries. In order to foster household participation and contribution in saving intermediaries, policies have been suggested and hopefully will be considered when the government is ready to revise the policies for financial intermediaries in rural Vietnam. 
APPENDIX II Tobit Estimation
Variables
